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Hegel’s Therapeutic Conception of Philosophy 
 
      The aim of this paper is to argue that Hegel has a therapeutic conception of philosophy, 
and also to argue that in significant respects this anticipates the classical pragmatist position, 
which is also interpreted as offering a therapeutic approach. In the first section, I introduce 
Hegel’s views on how theoretical reasoning has an important connection with practical life. I 
argue that this important connection between theoretical reason and the practical establishes 
Hegel as a member of the therapeutic tradition – broadly conceived. My focus in section II of 
the paper is on the relation between Hegelian therapy and Wittgenstein’s quietistic approach. 
I conclude my discussion of Hegel’s therapeutic conception of philosophy in section III, by 
arguing that Hegelian therapy has much in common with classical pragmatist 
metaphilosophy, which I also take to involve a therapeutic approach.1    
 
I 
One of the most well-known features of ancient philosophy, starting with Socrates and 
through to the post-Aristotelian philosophical traditions of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and 
Pyrrhonism, is the idea that philosophy must play a role in helping us to lead the good life.2 
In contrast to the predominantly more academically-oriented conception of philosophy that 
one finds in current philosophical discourse, ancient philosophers adopted a more expansive 
conception of philosophical practice, where even when these philosophers employed 
techniques recognisably similar to those of contemporary philosophy, figures such as Plato 
and Epicurus appeared to rationalise the use of such techniques by markedly therapeutic 
goals.3 For example, Socrates links conceptual analysis with the moral improvement of 
himself and his interlocutors, cf. Apology 38a. 
      However, whilst ancient philosophy can be understood to emphasise the link between 
philosophical reflection and personal/communal flourishing,4 such an explicit connection 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Bob Stern and Paul Raekstad for their invaluable feedback on previous drafts of this 
paper. 
2 See Nussbaum (1994) for an excellent analysis of the idea of philosophy as therapeutic in the Hellenistic 
tradition. See also Sorabji (2000) for an excellent analysis of the development of the therapeutic tradition from 
Stoicism to Christian Neoplatonism.  
3 I am using ‘therapeutic’ here in a broad sense, such that it links to the good life / the flourishing life. Recent 
contemporary discussions of philosophy having a necessarily therapeutic dimension to conceptual reflection 
include the following works: Gitsoulis (2007), Harré (2008), and Fischer (2011a, 2011b, 2011c).  
4 Of course, one must stress that the notion of philosophy as therapeutic is not unique to European philosophy, 
as the commitment to regarding conceptual reflection as having a eudaimonistic and cathartic function is made 
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between the theoretical and the practical is not a feature that one would prima facie associate 
with the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical tradition. On the contrary, they appear to be 
focused on more technical debates in metaphysics and epistemology, involving claims 
regarding synthetic a priori knowledge, the objective validity of the Categories, the ideality 
of the finite, and so on. Furthermore, there seems to be good reason to suppose that 
philosophy in general hardly appears to be therapeutic, given how technical issues such as the 
problem of vagueness or of other minds have been the focal points of debate in academic 
philosophy. Nonetheless, despite the appearance of some lack of interest in drawing 
connections between philosophical reflection and the good life,5 I will argue that there is in 
fact every reason to suppose that the German Idealists were staunchly committed to drawing 
such a connection. I wish to focus in particular on Hegel’s views on the relationship between 
theoretical reason and practical life. Specifically, I would like to draw attention to how Hegel 
came to adopt a therapeutic approach, where Hegel’s therapeutic conception of philosophy 
sets itself the therapeutic goal of helping us feel ‘at home in the world’.6 
      Hegel’s views on the relationship between theoretical reason and practical life are partly 
motivated by his dissatisfaction with Kant’s understanding of how exactly our conceptual 
capacities enable us to think about the world from our specifically human perspective, which 
Hegel precisely sees as preventing us from feeling ‘at home in the world’. What Hegel finds 
unattractive about Kant’s understanding of categorial concepts (and conceptual form) is his 
worry about subjectivism, where because the categories are ‘only our thoughts’, we then 
seem to ourselves to be cut off from the fundamental nature of reality, with all the disquiet 
that must lead to, Kant’s consoling words notwithstanding.7 Another interesting dimension to 
Hegel’s charge of subjectivism8 is that there is good reason to suppose that Hegel chastised 
Kant for accounting for human discursivity independently of its historical and social contexts. 
                                                                                                                                                        
explicit in Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical traditions in the East. For a very useful guide to how 
eastern philosophical schools regarded philosophy to be therapeutic, see Ganeri & Carlisle (2010).  
5 What I have claimed could lead one to suppose that most philosophers turn out to be part of the therapeutic 
tradition, so that the term ‘therapeutic tradition’ appears to be vacuous. However, my point is not to divide up 
the tradition into camps, but merely to show that more philosophers can be put within the tradition than may 
appear prima facie.  
6 The only paper that I have come across that explicitly discusses Hegel’s metaphilosophical commitments to a 
therapeutic model of enquiry is Quante (2004). See the addition to Section 4 of the Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Right for Hegel’s first explicit use of the idea of at-homeness-in-the-world.  
7 Hegel’s charge is best expressed in Encyclopaedia, §41z: 67-68.   
8 The topic of Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism is one of most important issues in Kant-Hegel 
scholarship. I can only briefly discuss the relevant issues here, because a proper discussion of Hegel’s critique 
would take us well outside the desired focus of this paper. For more in depth interpretations and assessments of 
Hegel’s rejection of transcendental idealism, see the following works: Ameriks (1985), Bird (1987), Stern 
(2002), Kreines (2006, 2008), Sedgwick (2012), Förster (2012), and Bowman (2013). Of course, this is no by 
means whatsoever an exhaustive list of scholarly papers on the subject.   
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As a result, Hegel thinks of the Kantian subject as a res cogitans: Kant overlooked the nature 
of the human subject as a res ambulans and a res dormiens, which goes alongside its rational 
nature, once again leaving us estranged, this time from ourselves. To put the worry another 
way, Hegel criticises Kant for having failed to properly surpass Cartesianism.9 Ultimately, 
then, Hegel’s fundamental worry about Kantianism, that transcendental idealism is too 
narrow and too restricted, can be seen to be as much about the question of how we can come 
to be ‘at home in the world’, as it is about technical questions and puzzles, such as the 
problem of synthetic a priori knowledge or disputes concerning the nature of space.   
      Given that Hegel’s principal philosophical concern is with establishing how one can come 
to be at home in the world, this may shed light on why Hegel insists that philosophy has an 
important role to play in the Bildung of man as opposed to being an esoteric practice with 
little or no relevance to our ultimate well-being.10 In making this claim, we can begin to see 
how Hegel conceives of philosophy as a therapeutic discipline. To understand this in detail, 
we need to look more closely at the relationship between Kant and Hegel on this issue.    
      Despite Hegel’s misgivings about transcendental idealism, there is something about 
Kant’s metaphilosophical commitments that Hegel finds not just to be important but also 
largely correct. Hegel seems to think that Kant conceives of philosophy as having an edifying 
or normative/existential function: as I understand Kant, the critique of theoretical reason 
would involve a transformation of not just our cognitive practices but also how we 
understand the role of thought in our lives. By understanding ourselves in a new way, as laid 
out by the Copernican turn in the discipline, we realise that our cognitive constitution does 
not merely serve as mechanical conditions to experience things in certain ways – we also 
realise that the kind of cognitive constitution we have determines the type of 
phenomenological relation we have to our cognitive environment. For example, our 
categorial structure is based on concepts such as causality, necessity, unity, and substance. 
These concepts do not just enable us to experience a world sans phrase, but they also serve to 
enable us to experience the world in a specific way: being endowed with concepts provides 
human beings to represent the world as a phenomenologically robust environment: we are 
acquainted with a world that has nomological properties and objects that persist through 
change. In other words, one of Kant’s central insights is the notion that being endowed with a 
capacity of conceptual thought and reflection does not merely enable human beings to 
experience things, but crucially also enables human beings to see the world from a particular 
                                                 
9 See Taylor (1972) for a related claim.  
10 Such insistence can best be found in the general tone of the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.  
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perspective. This perspective, moreover, is the foundation for the superstructure of how we 
go about our daily lives. Hegel can be seen as finding Kant’s insight into how thought has 
this normative/existential function to be fundamentally important. 
      This view is supported by Hegel’s discussion of Kant’s Antinomies of Pure Reason, 
where he claims that Kant’s insights are some of “most important and deepest advances in 
philosophy in the modern period” (EL: §48). Of course, Hegel is also very critical of Kant’s 
treatment of the Antinomies. However, why Hegel thinks Kant’s treatment of the Antinomies 
is dissatisfying is not because Kant simply got things wrong; rather, Hegel’s critique is based 
on his view that Kant failed to draw more Antinomies from the structure of thought. This is 
what Hegel means by claiming that Kant is restricted by “finite categories”. For Hegel, what 
Kant ought to have done is notice how “antinomy finds itself … in all objects of all kinds, in 
all representations, concepts and ideas” (EL: §48). In other words, Kant appears to have 
failed to develop his important insights.  
      Hegel’s means of ‘completing’ this Kantian programme is his notion of the forms of 
consciousness. The reason why the forms of consciousness serve this particular function is 
that they properly bring out the existential significance of the antinomial conflict. This goes 
beyond the purely theoretical goal of highlighting the ubiquity of contradiction in discursive 
thought, because such a goal is still abstract despite being systematic. Rather what Hegel 
wants to achieve is to illustrate how antinomial conflict manifests itself in experience and 
how antinomial conflict actually impacts on our ways of representing objects, ourselves, and 
the world as a whole. Such a project is the only one that has justified claims to being a 
philosophical science. The way in which Hegel conceives of thought as impacting on both 
our cognitive and practical lives is by conceiving of a form of consciousness as amounting to 
a Weltanschauung – a way of seeing the world from a particular perspective. To put this very 
briefly, every form of consciousness that the phenomenological subject traverses through – 
from Sense-Certainty to Absolute Knowing – is a different way of representing oneself and 
the world for the purposes of achieving ‘at homeness’ in the world. In other words, the 
dialectic of human thought through its phenomenological development is the historical 
illustration of our attempts to find a way of looking at ourselves and our world that enables us 
to flourish. As such, the connection between theoretical reason and practical life lies in how 
whatever form of consciousness one adopts determines how one will act in the world: if one 
thinks about oneself as radically separate from one’s environment, then such a worldview will 
result in the subject being unable to properly interact with others, viz. the struggle for 
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recognition; or if one fails to conceive of social institutions as being capable of reform and 
structural revision, then such a worldview will result in the subject finding that social 
institution incapable of enabling societal improvement and development, viz. Hegel’s 
analysis of Antigone. For Hegel, the drama of consciousness in its constant flux from one 
form of consciousness to another is equivalent to consciousness desperately trying to find a 
way of being at peace with various philosophical problematics, such as the relationship 
between universality and particularity, identity and difference, desire and duty, scepticism 
and dogmatism, hope and despair, and the state and the individual. The task of finding a way 
of being at peace with these antinomial conflicts effectively amounts to finding a way of 
enabling human beings to flourish. As such, for Hegel, there is compelling reason to regard 
his speculative philosophy and phenomenological method as making him a member of the 
therapeutic tradition broadly conceived. 
      As we saw earlier, the therapeutic tradition broadly conceived goes back to the Socratic 
schools. However, since the mid-20th century this tradition has been more narrowly 
associated with a particular conception of therapy, which is known as ‘quietism’.11 In what 
follows, I shall argue Hegel conceives of philosophy as therapeutic and that he has a nuanced 
form of philosophical quietism.   
 
II  
Wittgenstein is usually credited with having pioneered philosophical quietism.12 Broadly 
speaking, quietism is the methodological view that philosophers should aim to eliminate, as 
opposed to solve, philosophical problems and return us to a state of intellectual peace.13 To 
see what this means, we need to understand various sections of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations. In §125, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a 
mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a 
clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the 
contradiction is resolved. 
                                                 
11 Philosophers who are usually regarded as philosophical quietists include Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. 
Austin, Norman Malcolm, Richard Rorty, and John McDowell. One could also arguably include Jennifer 
Hornsby as a member of the quietist tradition.  
12 See Lesses (2002) and Mitsis (2002) for useful discussions of Epicurus’s proto-quietism on the subject of the 
fear of death. The broad quietist telos of attaining intellectual peace is made even more explicit in Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, which stresses the ideal of ataraxia – a tranquil state of mind and complete freedom from 
disturbance. See Nussbaum (1994), Machuca (2006), and Striker (2010) for useful discussions of the Pyrrhonist 
concept of ataraxia.  
13 For a useful discussion of philosophical quietism, see McDowell (1994).  
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According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems (which he defines in §111 as “deep 
disquietudes”) are not meant to be solved in the sense that philosophers aim to find a 
satisfactory answer to the question that causes us aporias. Rather, these problems are meant to 
be eliminated or undermined by understanding the framework that gives rise to the 
disquietude in the first place. In other words, unlike the problem-solving model of the 
philosophical enterprise, which grants legitimacy to various philosophical questions, quietism 
denies that various philosophical questions are legitimate, and as such rejects the idea that 
they should be answered, and that one should even raise these issues in the first place.14 As 
Wittgenstein writes, “[eventually] the philosophical problems should completely disappear. 
The real discovery is the one … that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented 
by questions which bring itself in question” (PI: §133). So, for example, a quietist solution to 
the Problem of Interaction in philosophy of mind and the Placement Problem in 
metaphilosophy would look something like this: the question ‘How is it possible for the mind 
and the body to interact with one another?’ should not be asked, because it assumes that 
mental phenomena and physical phenomena are fundamentally distinct to begin with, where 
it is precisely this dualist framework gives rise to disquietude here. Once we understand that 
this dualist framework is the cause of the aporia, we must provide a more cogent framework 
which will give us intellectual peace. The Placement Problem,15 however, is more 
complicated to deal with: the question ‘How is it possible to place normativity in nature, 
given that normative phenomena appear to be outside the scope of the natural?’ should not be 
                                                 
14 Michael Quante provides a very helpful framework for discussing Hegel and the therapeutic model of 
enquiry: Quante distinguishes between therapeutic and ‘constructive’ philosophy of various differing forms. In 
its narrowest sense, the conception of philosophy as therapeutic claims that the function of philosophy solely 
consists in curing misunderstandings that are engendered by philosophical mistakes. In a wider sense, the 
conception of philosophy as therapeutic claims that the function of philosophy consists in curing 
misunderstandings that are engendered by both the mistakes of philosophers and the mistakes of non-
philosophers. With regard to ‘constructive’ philosophy, which Quante regards as equivalent to conceiving of 
philosophy as a problem-solving discipline, Quante draws four further distinctions: in the pejorative sense, this 
model of philosophy creates the problems that necessarily require therapeutic treatment by mistaking 
philosophical problematics for real/genuine problems; in its narrow sense, constructive philosophy provides 
solutions for real problems within common sense that pose genuine threats to the good life; in its wider sense, 
constructive philosophy goes further in wanting to provide a philosophical framework to support the 
assumptions of common sense, even when those assumptions are not the cause for various aporias; and in its 
revisionary sense, constructive philosophy aims to replace common sense, which it regards to be entirely 
bankrupt.  
15 As Huw Price (2004) suggests, the Placement Problem can be expressed in the following way: (1) All reality 
is ultimately natural reality; (2) whatever one wishes to admit into natural reality must be placed in natural 
reality; (3) moral facts, mathematical facts, universals, laws of nature, mental states, and so on do not seem 
admissible into natural reality; (4) therefore, if they are to be placed in nature, they must be forced into a 
category that does not seem appropriate for their specific characters, and if they cannot be placed in nature, then 
they must be either dismissed as non-genuine phenomena or at best regarded as second-rate phenomena.  
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asked, because the question is in and of itself flawed, and the question leaves itself open to 
two fundamentally dissatisfying answers.16 In the first case, the question is based on a 
mischaracterisation of normativity; in the latter case, our framework for answering the 
question is restricted to either bald naturalism or rampant Platonism.17 Once we understand 
that a problematic characterisation of normativity and a poor conceptual framework are the 
cause of the aporia, we can then be in a position to improve our framework by adopting 
liberal naturalism in the hope that this position will give us intellectual peace.18  
      Of course, my outline of these quietist solutions is meant to be very sketchy, for my 
outline is aimed at revealing the methodology of quietism, rather than being directed at 
addressing those two philosophical issues. As Wittgenstein wrote in the Philosophical 
Investigations, “[t]he philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness” 
(§255). In other words, the methodology of quietism roughly follows the approach of curing 
some kind of ailment or disease. Just as a physician will first diagnose the condition and then 
administer some cure, the quietist philosopher must first diagnose the relevant intellectual 
problem and then work out a cogent means of curing the aporia.  
      For Wittgenstein, the diagnosis of our maladies philosophiques is that we enter into 
conceptual difficulties by misusing ordinary language. The ‘metaphysical’ use of ordinary 
linguistic terms is the cause of our philosophical anxieties. What this signifies is that 
philosophers are the source of problematics, not because philosophers aim at deliberately 
muddying conceptual waters, but rather because philosophical speculation appears to 
inevitably conflict with our everyday linguistic practices. As mentioned previously, 
Wittgenstein claims that conceptual problems emerge from running up against the limits of 
language. Now, whilst the Tractarian Wittgenstein would have been inclined to remedy the 
problem by trying to improve or cleanse ordinary language, the later Wittgenstein seems to 
think that such a view is ultimately too philosophical. Rather, the cure for our cognitive 
maladies consists in understanding how ordinary language works and how we must stick 
with ordinary language. And what that linguistic enterprise involves is returning us to a form 
of life where we reflect non-philosophically. This, in other words, means that the true 
philosopher is the one who realises the futility and nonsense of philosophical enquiry. Only 
by becoming quietists can we achieve the Tractarian goal of kicking away the ladder and 
saying only what can be said. Philosophy, then, for the Wittgensteinian quietist eschews any 
                                                 
16 See Rorty (2010) for an engaging and typically provocative discussion of naturalism and quietism.  
17 See Macarthur (2008) for an excellent discussion of quietist responses to the nature-normativity debate.  
18 See Giladi (2014) for a discussion of this topic.  
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positive doctrines – rather than being concerned with defending substantive theories about the 
good or the true, it is concerned with exposing misuses of language. 
      Hegel, of course, is no Wittgensteinian and would almost certainly balk at the idea of 
eschewing any positive doctrines and admonishing philosophical reflection in favour of a 
retreat to ordinary consciousness and its binary categories of thought. But, given this, it 
seems difficult to maintain, let alone motivate, the case that he has a quietist conception of 
philosophical therapy. However, such a difficulty only arises if we think of quietism 
exclusively in Wittgensteinian ways. If we recall our previous definition of philosophical 
quietism, quietism is the methodological view that philosophers should aim to eliminate, as 
opposed to solve, philosophical problems and return us to a state of intellectual peace. 
Crucially, if one is inclined to eliminate/dissolve philosophical problems rather than solving 
them head-on, one can do so by either adopting Wittgenstein’s diagnostic and therapeutic 
approach or by adopting a Hegelian diagnostic and therapeutic approach. Namely, one can 
dissolve the relevant problematic either by finding it to be the result of a misuse of ordinary 
language and therefore recommend a return to common sense; or by finding it to be the result 
of a limited and non-dialectical conceptual structure and therefore recommend a dialectical 
critique of the relevant philosophical stance in question.   
      The following passage from the Phenomenology probably best illustrates Hegel’s 
diagnostic approach:  
 
The more that conventional opinion holds that the opposition between the true and the 
false is itself fixed and set, the more that it customarily expects to find itself in either 
agreement or in contradiction with any given philosophical system, and, if so, then in 
any explanation of such a system, the more it will merely see the one or the other.  It 
does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive 
development of truth as much as it sees merely contradiction within that diversity.  The 
bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and one might say that the former is 
refuted by the latter.  Likewise, by virtue of the fruit, the blossom itself may be declared 
to be a false existence of the plant, since the fruit emerges as the blossom’s truth as it 
comes to replace the blossom itself.  These forms are not merely distinguished from 
each other, but, as incompatible with each other, they also supplant each other.  
However, at the same time their fluid nature makes them into moments of an organic 
unity within which they are not only not in conflict with each other. Rather, one is 
equally as necessary as the other, and it is this equal necessity which alone constitutes 
the life of the whole.  However, in part, contradiction with regard to a philosophical 
system does not usually comprehend itself in this way, and, in part, the consciousness 
which apprehends the contradiction generally neither knows how to free the 
contradiction from its one-sidedness, nor how to sustain it as free-standing by taking 
cognizance of its reciprocally necessary moments, which themselves take shape as 
conflicts and as apparent incompatibilities. (PS: 2-3) 
 
 
9 
 
For Hegel, an important symptom of philosophical disquietude is how we tend to regard 
certain ideas to be fundamentally irreconcilable with one another. And we think in that way 
due to having a non-dialectical understanding of negation. Our ordinary (or natural) 
understanding of negation is one which sees the negation of a position as the complete 
obliteration of that position. This, in turn, serves as the grounds for the strength of the Law of 
Non-Contradiction. However, whilst our ordinary understanding of negation has both 
plausibility and practical value, the problem with this framework is not that the framework is 
false or incoherent, but rather that the framework cannot adequately make sense of the notion 
of development and growth. Hegel’s concern, then, with negation is with the philosophical 
aporias we run into when we reflect on the history of philosophical enquiry and how we try to 
understand the movements from one philosophical tradition to the next. We remain paralysed 
by these kinds of aporias, if we reflect only from the ordinary perspective of negation. 
Therefore, the remedy for this is to improve our philosophical understanding. For Hegel, 
specifically, one way of successfully accomplishing such a task is by distinguishing between 
reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand). Unlike Kant, Hegel does not claim that 
“these terms … designate completely independent functions or faculties. Reason is simply the 
necessary result of the immanent movement of the understanding”.19 In other words, reason is 
in some sense part of understanding, insofar as reason is a form of analytic explanation, but 
in another sense, reason is distinct from understanding, insofar as reason is also a “form of 
holistic explanation, which shows how all finite things are parts of a wider whole”.20 For 
Hegel, the principal advantage of drawing this distinction between reason and understanding 
is that we can be in a position to not be wrapped up in the various dualisms which are the 
inevitable consequence of reflecting only from the perspective of understanding, i.e. purely 
analytical forms of reflection. What reason provides consciousness with is the means to avoid 
the pitfalls of dualisms and the problems of analysis by thinking dialectically, i.e. by drawing 
distinctions yet establishing interconnectedness to a whole.  
This particular brand of quietism is perhaps best explicated by Hegel in this famous 
passage from his Lectures on Fine Art:    
 
What man seeks in this situation, ensnared here as he is in finitude on every side, is the 
region of a higher, more substantial, truth, in which all oppositions and contradictions in 
the finite can find their final resolution, and freedom its full satisfaction. This is the 
region of absolute, not finite, truth. The highest truth, truth as such, is the resolution of 
                                                 
19 F. C. Beiser, 2005: 164.  
20 Ibid., p. 165.  
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the highest opposition and contradiction. In it validity and power are swept away from 
the opposition between freedom and necessity, between spirit and nature, between 
knowledge and its object, between law and impulse, from opposition and contradiction 
as such, whatever forms they make take. Their validity and power as opposition and 
contradiction is gone. Absolute truth proves that neither freedom by itself, as subjective, 
sundered from necessity, is absolutely a true thing nor, by parity of reasoning, is 
truthfulness to be ascribed necessity isolated and taken by itself. The ordinary 
consciousness, on the other hand, cannot extricate itself from this opposition and either 
remains despairingly in contradiction or else casts it aside and helps itself in some other 
way. But philosophy enters into the heart of the self-contradictory characteristics, 
knows them in their essential nature, i.e. as in their one-sidedness not absolute but self-
dissolving, and it sets them in the harmony and unity which is truth. To grasp this 
Concept is the task of philosophy. (LA I: 99-100) 
 
The arguments Hegel gives in this engaging passage – namely that the task of philosophy is 
to lead our ways of understanding all aspects of our world away from purely dualistic and 
oppositional ways of thinking, and to enable us to reflect on the intelligibility of both 
difference and unity in our world – serve as a powerful critique of quietist strategies that aim 
to provide philosophical cures by means of effectively ignoring the philosophical nature of 
certain problematics. As he writes, only a dialectical conception of philosophical enquiry and 
a dialectical conceptual resource can provide the conditions for achieving ‘full satisfaction’. 
What this means is that the kind of quietist strategy advocated by Wittgensteinians may very 
well provide some satisfaction to enquirers, but ultimately that sense of intellectual 
disquietude is hollow and is in fact disquieting more than substantially therapeutic. The kind 
of intellectual approach that can provide ‘full satisfaction’ is one which explicitly tarries with 
the negative – this is because only that model of enquiry and its corresponding conceptual 
resources make concerted efforts to unify conceptual contraries in a nuanced way to remove 
the initial and powerful image of opposition and to move us to seeing them as constituting 
harmonious determinations of a complex whole.  
      By now, it should be reasonably clear that one can make a good case for conceiving of 
Hegel as a particular kind of philosophical quietist. In what follows, I would like to explain 
how exactly Hegel’s brand of philosophical therapy – his variety of quietism – can and 
should be understood as anticipating crucial features of classical pragmatist metaphilosophy. 
However, before moving on to this issue, it is important that we first have a basic grip on 
what exactly one means by ‘pragmatism’.  
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III 
Hilary Putnam has identified four characteristics of pragmatism:21 the rejection of scepticism; 
the commitment to fallabilism; the rejection of strict dualisms such as the distinction between 
nature and freedom; and what he has called “the primacy of practice”.22 For the purposes of 
this paper, I want to focus on the latter two characteristics. A locus classicus for rejecting 
strict dualisms is William James’s famous discussion of the conflict between the ‘tough-
minded’23 and the ‘tender-minded’. As Christopher Hookway writes, “[t]he tough-minded 
have an empiricist commitment to experience and going by ‘the facts’, while the tender-
minded have more of a taste for a priori principles which appeal to the mind. The tender-
minded tend to be idealistic, optimistic and religious, while the tough-minded are normally 
materialist, pessimistic and irreligious. The tender-minded are ‘free-willist’ and dogmatic; the 
tough-minded are ‘fatalistic’ and sceptical”.24 According to James, one cannot resolve this 
dispute by favouring one or the other.25 In other words, we cannot claim that empirical and 
natural science trump religiosity and Romanticism, and we cannot claim that religiosity and 
Romanticism trump empirical and natural science. To use John McDowell’s terminology, 
neither bald naturalism nor rampant Platonism will do the required work. Instead, we must 
find a ‘mediating philosophy’ to reconcile the scientific image with the manifest image, to 
reconcile “empiricist epistemic responsibility with moral and religious optimism”.26 Such a 
particular type of philosophy is needed, because only a mediating philosophy can properly 
                                                 
21 See Putnam (1994a).  
22 See Putnam (1994b).  
23 A particularly vivid portrayal of the tough-minded is James’s discussion of Ernest Renan and Emile Zola: 
 
“Both are athirst for the facts of life, and both think the facts of human sensibility to be of all facts the most 
worthy of attention. Both agree, moreover, that sensibility seems to be there for no higher purpose – certainly 
not … for the sake of bringing mere outward rights to pass and frustrating outward wrongs … under the pages 
of both there sounds incessantly the hoarse bass of vanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas, which the reader may hear, 
whenever he will, between the lines. No writer of this French romantic school has a word of rescue from the 
hour of satiety with the things of life – the hour in which we say ‘I take no pleasure in them’ – or from the hour 
of terror at the world’s vast meaningless grinding, if perchance such hours should come. For terror and satiety 
are facts of sensibility like any others; and at their own hour they reign in their own right. The heart of the 
romantic utterances, whether poetical, critical, or historical, is this inward remedilessness, what Carlyle calls this 
far-off whimpering of wail and woe. And from this romantic state of mind there is absolutely no possible 
theoretic escape. Whether, like Renan, we look upon life in a more refined manner, as a romance of the spirit; or 
whether, like the friends of M. Zola we … prefer to be cynical, and call the world a ‘roman experimental’ on an 
infinite scale – in either case the world appears to us potentially as what the same Carlyle one called it, a vast, 
gloomy, solitary Golgotha and mill of death”. (TWTB: 133-134)   
24 C. Hookway, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/#PraPra  
25 Echoing Fichte on the oscillation between dogmatism and idealism, James also thinks that one tends to be 
stuck in either one camp or the other.  
26 Hookway, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/#PraPra  
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represent a “method for settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be 
interminable”.27 
      An important question to ask now is how we should understand James’s notion of 
‘settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be interminable’. As I see it, there is no 
reason to suppose that James’s idea of settling a dispute that appears to be interminable 
should not be thought of in terms of the broad philosophical quietist strategy of dissolving 
problematics to enable us achieve a sense of intellectual peace.28 Given this, we now need to 
explain why only a mediating philosophy is able to dissolve problematics and enable us to 
achieve a sense of intellectual peace. To do so, let us briefly consider two instances of 
apparently interminable disputes: (i) the mind-world dualism; and (ii) the individual-society 
relation.  
      Regarding (i), what was partly characteristic of early modern philosophy was the idea that 
there was a fundamental gap between mind and world – between the subjects of experience 
and the objects of experience. The picture of empirical reality as presented by that tradition is 
of a realm of separate and inert objects, which requires us to first understand each object 
individually and then determine its connectedness with other objects. Not only that, but the 
mind is also fundamentally separate from the world of experience. We are passive recipients 
of raw and non-conceptual representational content, which we then process in order to have 
an epistemic grip on the world. However, in contrast to the Enlightenment’s portrayal of 
minds as mirrors of nature, James (as well as Peirce and Dewey in differing ways) aimed to 
dissolve the strict distinction between mind and world not by collapsing one into the other but 
rather by reconceiving the content of experience as well as the relation between the subject of 
experience and their cognitive environment. Experience provides a rational and intelligible 
structure constituted by directly perceivable ontologically complex, determinate objects. And 
to be a thinking subject is not to be a disembodied res cogitans that is separate from the world 
and is little more than a cognitive voyeur. Rather, to be a thinking subject is to be an 
embodied being embedded in the world. As Matthew Ratcliffe writes, “[w]e do not 
                                                 
27 W. James, 1907: 28.  
28 Of course, for James, this must not be understood in purely theoretical terms: the real value of dissolving 
problematics and establishing a new and nuanced conceptual framework consists in the social and political 
benefits of adopting pragmatist commitments. For example, James’s caustic criticisms of ‘intellectualism’ – a 
form of enquiry which is essentially dissociated from the exigencies of practice – aim at illustrating the 
potentially disastrous social and political consequences of such a form of enquiry.   
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philosophise as disembodied loci of rational thought, stripped of our practical, affective, 
bodily attunement to things”.29 And as James writes himself:  
 
Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form our 
philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion co-operate just as they do in 
practical affairs …30 
 
Philosophical enquiry, for James, must not be conceived of in the way that early modern 
rationalism characterised philosophical enquiry. While the Cartesian project of pure enquiry 
aimed to provide substantive conceptions of knowledge by avoiding corporeality and 
sociality, James conceived of pragmatism as the philosophical school of thought to provide 
substantive conceptions of truth and knowledge by embedding all human capacities in the 
world. As he famously wrote, the most pressing problem with early modern rationalism is 
that it “seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the 
vast slow-breathing unconscious Kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown tides”.31 
Such a critique appears to be characteristic of opponents of Cartesianism, ranging from the 
post-Kantian idealists, through Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, to Rorty.32 Though 
all these philosophers differ from one another in important respects, they are all committed to 
the view that the mind-world relation must be understood in terms of cognitive intimacy 
rather than cognitive voyeurism. And to do so necessarily involves emphasising how thinking 
is necessarily bound up with direct bodily engagement with things and implicit social 
relations with other rational agents in the world. Once we frame the concepts of mind and 
world in this way, then the dispute is dissolved and we are no longer troubled by the 
philosophical anxieties arising from the aporias caused by the strict dualist framework. 
      Regarding (ii), the classical pragmatist approach to the dualism of society and the 
individual is one which finds the framework that gives rise to oscillating between 
authoritarianism and anarchism or conservatism and liberalism to be the source of the 
philosophical malady. For example, Dewey is critical of classical liberalism for conceiving of 
the individual as prior to society and that social institutions must therefore be organised in 
such a way so as to serve the interests of pre-societal individuals. In the same way that the 
early modern tradition conceived of the phenomenological relation between mind and world 
as one of fundamental separation, Dewey claims that classical liberalism is a practical 
                                                 
29 M. Ratcliffe, 2011: 126.  
30 W. James, 1956: 92.  
31 James, 1912: 277-8.   
32 See Taylor (1972) for an excellent discussion of this topic.  
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exemplification of “the most pervasive fallacy of philosophical thinking”,33 namely dividing 
up and separating phenomena into strict distinctions from one another. Contra this picture of 
the individual and its corresponding conception of freedom, Dewey aims to eliminate the 
philosophical pathology of a radical separation of the individual and social institutions by 
advocating a nuanced political holism: 
 
Liberalism knows that an individual is nothing fixed, given ready-made. It is something 
achieved, and achieved not in isolation but with the aid and support of conditions, 
cultural and physical: - including in “cultural”, economic, legal and political institutions 
as well as science and art. (LW 11: 291)    
  
As with the dissolution of the mind/world dualism, the individual and society are no longer 
conceived of as fundamentally separate from another, pace the classical liberal picture 
according to which one’s freedom is understood exclusively negatively as autonomy from any 
external constraint on one’s ability to pursue such-and-such. Rather, according to Dewey’s 
political holism, we understand freedom in terms of a positive capacity to realise oneself. 
Crucially, moreover, such realisation can only be achieved by conceiving of individuality as 
necessarily embedded in a reflective and social environment. To put this more simply, where 
the previous philosophical traditions separated mind and world and individuality and 
sociality, the classical pragmatists hoped to make mind and world and individuality and 
sociality interdependent with one another. In shifting our way of thinking from separating 
phenomena to understanding the fundamental interdependency between phenomena which 
appear to be conceptual contraries, we dissolve the dispute and are then able to have a sense 
of peace. 
      Thus far, we have seen how classical pragmatists took their novel ideas to be therapeutic: 
they dissolve philosophical problematics by rejecting the conceptual framework that gives 
rise to the problematic in the first place. And by dissolving the problematic and advocating a 
nuanced conception of the philosophical issue in question, they hoped to return enquirers to a 
state of philosophical quietude. Crucially, though, one should not think that the classical 
pragmatists are best interpreted in a Wittgensteinian mode, even though they share the broad 
idea of dissolving philosophical problems: unlike Wittgenstein, the classical pragmatists’ 
remedy for intellectual aporia involves a substantive philosophical improvement rather than a 
                                                 
33 J. Dewey, 1981-1990 5: 5.  
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return to a pre-philosophical form of life.34 Such substantive philosophical improvement, to 
use Dewey’s expression, involves ‘getting over’ philosophical problems stemming from pre-
modern conceptual frameworks, to the extent that philosophy would directly contribute to 
social and political development. For example, the fundamental concern of Peirce’s 
Pragmatic Maxim and a fortiori his variety of pragmatism is to establish human flourishing 
by properly understanding the metaphysical picture of reality and properly understanding the 
nature and methods of enquiry. As Hookway writes, “Peirce’s work in ethics is motivated by 
a desire to explain the possibility of adopting the life of science as he understands it”.35 This 
is elaborated by Paul Forster, who claims that “[o]n [Peirce’s] view, human beings are not 
cogs in a vast cosmic mechanism, but rather are free, creative agents capable of transforming 
the world through the active realisation of intelligent ideals”.36 What is at stake when one 
puts forward philosophical theories or even when one does philosophy is not merely whether 
or not one attains sufficiently good levels of representational accuracy. Peirce is not 
particularly interested in this purely theoretical mode of cognitive activity. Rather, what 
matters for Peirce is “an ultimate, impartial, binding and rational framework for the 
organisation and fulfilment of human potential”.37 The explanation for why Peirce was so 
explicitly opposed to nominalism and its philosophical correlates is that nominalism and its 
philosophical correlates are obstacles to the organisation and fulfilment of human potential: 
nominalism seeks to restrict enquiry and by doing so, nominalism prevents us from 
actualising our rational capacities. And because our rational capacities fail to be fully realised 
by nominalism, the possibility of us flourishing does not obtain.  
      It should be clear that Hegel’s brand of therapy anticipates a crucial feature of classical 
pragmatist metaphilosophy, given how he explicitly claimed that the task of philosophy is to 
dissolve and overcome strict dualisms and binary categories of thought.38     
                                                 
34 It is worth noting that Peirce’s notion of ‘critical common-sensism’ does not appear to advocate a return to a 
pre-philosophical form of life even though Peirce is supportive of common sense, see EP 2:346-353; CP 5.439-
452; CP 5.505-525; CP 5.498-499; EP 2:432-433.  
35 C. Hookway, 2013: 192.  
36 P. Forster, 2011: 245.  
37 Ibid., p. 246.   
38 By establishing such a connection between Hegel and the classical pragmatists, there is good reason to see 
why exactly Dewey wrote of the “permanent deposit” Hegel had left on his philosophical commitments, cf. LW 
5: 154. There is also good reason to suppose James’s explicit hostility to Hegel may in fact be rather misplaced. 
For had James (and Peirce to some extent) had really known Hegel, rather than understood Hegel via the 
distorted view of him presented by F. E. Abbot, Royce and the British Idealists, James (and Peirce to some 
extent) may have had a far more positive attitude to Hegel. See Stern (2009) for further on Hegel’s reception by 
Peirce and James.  
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      This conveniently leads to understanding the ultimate thrust of Hegel’s brand of therapy 
and how exactly it anticipates classical pragmatist metaphilosophical commitments. What is 
the value to be gained by dissolving problematics and rejecting strict dualisms? One can 
recall previously that a characteristic of pragmatism is the Primacy of Practice. I take this 
idea to refer to conceiving of a philosophical endeavour as being significant if and only if that 
philosophical endeavour has demonstrable effects on us and the world we inhabit.39 The 
diagnostic part of what can be called pragmatic therapy, as developed respectively by Hegel 
and the classical pragmatists, has two purposes: the first is to locate and establish the cause of 
our intellectual and existential disquietude; and the second is to determine which questions 
are worth worrying about in the first instance. Consequently, the recommended therapeutic 
programme offered by Hegel and the classical pragmatists – though differing in important 
ways – is specifically designed to foster and engender a genuine sense of autonomy and 
human bien être. Both Hegel and the classical pragmatists are committed to seeing human 
beings as amphibians of sorts40 – we are intellectual and affective; we are rational and also 
capable of irrationality; and we are animals that are self-interpreting. But the kind of 
rationality we exhibit when we develop our second nature and cultural agency is one which 
recognises the need to avoid transcending the empirical world in an effort to cope with the 
variety of unpleasant and harmful things in the world. We recognise the deficiency of being 
too tender-minded. Crucially, though, this does not mean that human mindedness either 
adopts a depressing and pessimistic stance or a jocund Panglossian attitude to the strife we 
find all around us. On the contrary, it means that we are compelled to find genuinely 
meaningful and practical reasons to conceive of the world as rationally intelligible, not 
because the intelligible structure of the world illustrates that we can know everything about 
the world if we exercise our conceptual capacities in the best possible way, but because our 
rationality enables us to think and feel that we can make sense of things. However, we can 
only make sense of things and thus feel at home in the world if we are provided with the 
freedom to conduct our enquiries with epistemic and moral responsibility. Hence, for both the 
Hegelian and classical pragmatist conception of therapy, there is no separation of our 
philosophic lives from our social/political/daily lives, and that the concept of abstract 
philosophical ideas which have no concrete significance to our efforts of feeling at home in 
the world must be committed to the flames.  
                                                 
39 To put this more crudely, a philosophical endeavour is significant if and only if that endeavour has clear 
impact on our lives and our environment.  
40 See Pinkard (2012) for further on Hegel’s amphibian analogy.  
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